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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 8663

ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba
Hardman Auto Sales, et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
ARTHUR HARDMAN
PRELIMINARY ST~TEMENT
On December 20, 1955, Nathan Child was driving a 1951 International Pickup Truck east on
Highway 40, approximately 10 miles west of Salt
Lake City when the vehicle suddenly veered from
the south center of the highway to the north side,
where it collided with an automobile driven by plaintiff, George W. Williams, resulting in serious injuries to him. The plaintiff brought this action to
recover damages against Nathan Child, Arthur
1
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Hardman, dba Hardman Auto Sales and Barrus
Motor Company. The suit was brought against
Hardman as a defendant on the theory that Child
was his servant or agent and against Barrus Motor
Company on the theory that the steering apparatus
and the wheels of the vehicle were in a defective
condition, which the Barrus Motor Company knew
or should have known.
The allegations of negligence were denied by
all three defendants. Hardman also denied that
Child was his agent or servant.
When the plaintiff had rested, the court, upon
motion, dismissed the Barrus Motor Company from
the action. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendents Hardman
and Child in the sum of $78,055.17.
!This appeal is taken by the defendant Hardman
upon the grounds that there was no evidence to submit to the jury on the issue of whether Child was
his servant or agent and that his motion for a
directed verdict of no cause of action should have
been granted. He also contends that the court erroneously gave certain instructions and refused to give
others, and that the verdict was so excessive as to
indicate the jury was governed by passion or prejudice.
2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Hardman is a resident of Sunset,
Utah, where he operated a garage and used car lot
(R. 122). The defendant Child had known Hardman
for some time before December 20, 1955 (the date
of the accident) . They were friends; Child had purchased cars from him in the past.
Sometime before December 20th Child told
Hardman he was interested in buying a used pickup truck (R. 124). A short time later Hardman informed Child that he had located an International
1951 pickup truck which might interest him, and
arrangements were made for Child to accompany
Hardman to Tooele, Utah in order that he could see
the vehicle ( R. 82) . They drove from Sunset to
Tooele in Hardman's wrecker truck. Hardman did
not pay Child any wages or compensation for making the trip, nor did Child pay any of the trip exp8nse ( R. 133).
After arriving in Tooele they inspected the
pickup truck; took it for a test drive during which
both drove it. The test revealed that certain minor
repairs were necessary. Child said if those defects
were fixed he would take the truck ( R. 94) . Hardman told Child that he would not pay Barrus Motor
Company for the truck unless Child would take it
as he did not want to stock any merchandise at that
time of the year ( R. 131). Barrus Motor made the
3
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repairs. The truck was then accepted by Child at the
agreed purchase price of $650.00 plus the turn-in
value of Child's old truck (R. 97 and 132). Child intended to pay Hardman $500.00 cash on the purchase price when they got back to Sunset and to ob.. tain credit for the balance (R. 97). Hardman
paid Barrus $600.00 for the truck. They did not have
the Registration Certificate but did deliver to Hardman the Certificate of Title, which he did not deliver to Child (R. 125, 126). He intended to place
"Stickers" on the truck when he got back to his
place of business .( R. 128). The purpose of the
stickers is to allow the purchaser to drive the vehicle
for tw·enty days in order that he may have time to
obtain license plates (R. 132). The Certificate of
Title obtained from Barrus would be sent in to the
State Motor Vehicle Department for a new Certificate of Title which v1ould be issued to Child in his
name (R. 135).
The deal between Hardman and Child for the
sale of the truck to Child was virtually complete in
Tooele ( R. 128). The paper work \vould be done
\vhen they returned to Sunset (R. 139). Hardman
did not intend to have Child sign a Conditional Sales
Contract nor did he intend to retain title until the
balance of the purchase price was paid (R. 137).
A note for the balance was mentioned but there was
no discussion as to its terms. Hardman assumed
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Child would sign a note ( R. 138). Hardman was
willing to accept Child's credit ( R. 140) .
Before leaving Tooele on the return trip Child
considered the truck his and wanted to drive it
back ( R. 99-100) . Hardman considered the truck
belonged to Child, .his only interest being to obtain
the purchase price (R. 141). Hardman gave no instructions on driving the truck to Child; however,
he did state that generally on trips of this kind
they occasionally passed each other ( R. 129-30,
134). On the return trip Child drove the pickup.
truck. Hardman towed another vehicle behind his
wrecker.
The collision with the car driven by the
plaintiff happened about one and one-half miles
west of Morton's Salt Plant on U. S. Highway 40!
After the accident Hardman made no demand on
Child for the purchase price of the truck because
-Child.was· off work for seven months and then lost
his job (R. 332).
STA:TEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.
5
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON
THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.

This case arose out of the same accident, and
the evidence on the issue of whether Child was acting in the capacity of Hardman's agent or servant in
driving the truck is substantially the same as the
evidence in the case of Ida M. Johnson. Administratrix of the estate of C. Tennyson Johnson, Deceased, vs. Arthur Hardman, et al., No. 8647, now
pending on appeal in this Court, and the case of
Walter Anderson vs. Arthur Hardman, et al., No.
8580, on which this Court has rendered a decision,
not yet final as the defendant will file a Petition
for Rehearing. Both parties made an exhaustive research of the law applicable on the issue of Hardn1an's responsibility for Child's operation of the
6
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truck in the appeal of those cases. The defendant
has no additional authories to cite to the Court on
the same issue in this appeal and in order to avoid
needless repitition, refers the Court to his briefs
filed on the appeal in the two preceding cases.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON
THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
DANT.

REQUESTED

BY

DEFEN-

Appellant contends that the court's instructions
considered as a whole were prejudicially erroneou~
to the defendant in that his theory of the case as
supported by the evidence was not submitted to the
JUry.
In the court's instruction number 1, which purported to set out the contentions of the parties, the
jury was told in substance that plaintiff alleged
Child was Hardman's agent and that Child was
negligent in driving the pickup truck; that the defendants denied they were negligent, but the instruction omitted the contention of Hardman that
Child was not his agent. Inasmuch as the instruction
purports to state the contentions of the parties,
omitting the issue of agency was probably interpreted by a jury of laymen as meaning there was
no issue on agency even though they were told in
the court's subsequent instruction number 2 that the
7
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burden of proof to show that Child was Hardman's
agent or servant was on the plaintiff.
The court's instruction number 6 reads as follows (R. 3'79) :
"You are instructed that whether one
person is agent of another depends upon right
of control of one over another, and if you find
from the evidence that after delivering the
truck to Child at Tooele Hardman had no control or right of control over the operation of
the vehicle and that it was not being driven
by Child for or on behalf of Hardman, then
you are instructed that Child was not the
agent of Hardman at the time of the accident
and your verdict must be for the defendant
Hardman."
·
The italicized part of this instruction requires
the jury to find that Child was Hardman's agent,
jf the truck was being driven "for or on behalf of
Hardman" even though the evidence showed Hardman had no control or right of control over the oper_ation of the vehicle, which is not in accord with the
law in this state. Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12,
207 P. 2d 809; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193
P. 2d 437.
Defendants earnestly contend that there was
no evidence whate~er to show that the relationship
of master and servant existed between Hardman
and Child. Child was not paid any wage or compensation by Hardman. In making the trip to Tooele he
was motivated only by his interest in buying the
8
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truck. However, the issue of whether Child was
Hardman's servant or employee was submitted to
the jury in instructions 2, 9 and 12. The law is well
settled that it is error to instruct the jury on an
issue of liability not supported by the evidence. See.
State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82
Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612.
In the case of Clay v. Dunford (Utah), 239 P.
2d 1075, it was held to be prejudicial error to intruct on assumption of risk when the facts in the
case did not present the issue.
The repetition of the issue of master and servant at the end of instructions 2, 9 and 12 unduly
en1phasize plaintiff's theory of recovery. In the case
of Shields v. Utah Light and Traction Company, 99
Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349, the court stated:
"The reiteration of given propositions to
a jury in the instructions does not have judicial approval."
After reviewing the detailed instructions the
court stated:
"And the ensuing emphasis on applicable
laws favorable to plaintiff's side as the result of the continued reference, and the repeating of certain law propositions resulted
in the unbalancing of the charge and error."
This case was cited with approval in the later
Utah decision of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279
P. 2d 1073.
9
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In its instruction number 8 the court submitted
the issue of whether Hardman and Child were engaged in a joint venture at the time of the accident,
which defendant contended was error and that the
evidence showed as a matter of law that this relationship did not exist in that it was undisputed that
Child did not contribute or pay anything towards the
expense of the trip. Hardman was not riding in the
truck driven by Child at the time of the accident,
the purchase price had been agreed upon and Child
had taken possession of the vehicle, Hardman's only
remaining interest in the transaction being to receive
the purchase price. If Hardman had been involved in
the accident, could his negligence have been imputed
to Child? The question suggests a negative answer.
If the relationship between them was joint venture,
it must work both ways. This issue was again submitted to the jury and repeated in instruction number 12, further, tending to emphasize the proposition.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF P ASSlON AND PREJUDICE.

The defendant Hardman does not contend that
the plaintiff's injuries were not serious or that he
will not sustain permanent disability as a result.
The attending physician testified that in his opinion
the plaintiff would be unable in the future to do
physical work of the type that he was doing at the
10
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time of the accident but might be able to do a sitting
job if qualified for it (R. 189). The doctor was unable to say whether or not the plaintiff would obtain
a union of the broken left femur ( R. 183). He anticipated excellent results on the injury to the right
knee (R. 184). The prognosis of recovery of injury
to the right arm was indefinite ( R. 185).
There can be no doubt that the jury was extremely sympathetic for the plaintiff, which was
reflected in their verdict. Anticipating such might
happen the defendant in Request No. 15 asked the
court to instruct the jury as follows (R. 41) :
''You are instructed that your verdict
must be based solely and exclusively upon the
evidence in the case. You should not be governed by passion, prejudice, sympathy or any
motive whatever, except fair and impartial
consideration of the evidence, and you must
not under any circumstances allow any sympathy which you may have or entertain for
the plaintiff to influence you in any degree
whatsoever in arriving at your verdict. The
court does not charge you not to sympathize
with the plaintiff because it is only natural
and human to sympathize with persons who
have sustained loss, affliction or misfortune,
but the court does charge you not to allow that
sympathy to enter in to your consideration of
the case or to influence your verdict."
which was refused.
We appreciate that whether a verdict is excessive damages on the facts and circumstances
11
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of each case. Nothing would be gained by citing the
court numerous decisions involving different fact
situations. The case of Stamp v. Union Pacific, 5
Utah 2d 397, 303 P. 2d 279, reaffirms the principle
and earlier decisions that the reviewing court has
the power to reduce a verdict clearly given under the
influence of passion or prejudice, and the opinion
analyzes the situations where the amount of the verdict so indicates.
We believe that this verdict is unreasonably
high in comparison with other verdicts in this jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the evidence established as a matter of law that Child was not
Hardman's agent in the manner in which he drove
the pickup_ truck, and the verdict should be set aside
and a judgment of no cause of action entered in
favor of the defendant Hardman, that the court's
instructions were prejudicially erroneous and the
verdict was so excessive as to clearly indicate the
jury was governed by passion or prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Arthur Hardman
1~
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